The email looks entirely ordinary. It comes from a supplier you have paid for years, in the same tone, with the same signature, and it says that the company has changed its bank, so would you please send the next payment to the new account. It arrives two days before payment day, when your accountant is busiest and your cash flow is tightest. Nothing in it is dramatic. That is exactly why it works.
This kind of message is one of the most common ways small businesses lose real money, and it does not need any clever technology. The attacker either takes over a mailbox or simply copies the look of a real one, then waits for a moment when a payment is due. The defence is equally unglamorous: a short habit that nobody is allowed to skip, however familiar the sender seems. This article sets out a four-step callback habit that a business with five people or fifty can adopt this week.
Why familiar senders are the dangerous ones
Most of us have been trained to distrust strange emails from strangers. The changed-bank-details message goes around that training. It arrives from a name you trust, it refers to a real invoice, and it asks for a small, plausible change. Nobody is asking you to click a suspicious link or download a file. You are simply being asked to update a field in your payment system, which is a task your team performs routinely.
Three things make this worse in a small business. First, the person who pays invoices is often the same person who is rushing to close the week, so attention is thin. Second, there is usually no second pair of eyes; the owner approves the batch without reading each beneficiary line. Third, supplier relationships are personal, and a polite request from a known contact feels rude to question. Attackers understand all three. They do not need to beat your security. They need to catch your Friday afternoon.
What the attack usually looks like
There are two common versions, and the habit below covers both. In the first, the supplier's real email account has been taken over. The message is genuinely from their address, written in their own words, and may even sit inside a long thread that you have both used before. In the second, the sender address is a near copy, with one letter changed or a different ending, and the display name is the supplier's. On a phone screen, where only the name is shown, the two look the same.
In both cases the message tends to carry a few quiet signals. It asks for the change shortly before a payment is due. It says the old account is closed or being audited, so the old details must not be used. It may ask you to keep the matter within a small group, or to confirm by return email only. And it often suggests that the call or the question is unnecessary because everything is explained in the attachment. Any one of these can be innocent. Together they are a reason to slow down by exactly one phone call.

Step one: treat every change of payment details as a request, never as an instruction
The first step is a change of mindset written into a rule. An email that proposes new bank details is a request for the finance team to verify something, not an instruction to update anything. Write the rule on one line and put it where the person who pays invoices will see it: no change to any beneficiary account is made on the strength of an email, a message or an attachment alone.
The rule works because it removes the judgement call. Nobody has to decide whether this particular email feels genuine. The answer is the same for every email, whether it comes from a new vendor or from a supplier of fifteen years. That also protects your staff. A junior accountant who says that the policy requires a callback is not being difficult. She is following a rule that the owner wrote, and no supplier can take offence at that.
Step two: call back on a number you already hold
The second step is the heart of the habit. Before any new account is accepted, someone telephones the supplier and asks them to confirm the change. The number must come from your own records: an earlier signed contract, a previous purchase order, the supplier's website typed in by hand, or the entry in your phone that has been there for years. It must never be the number printed in the email asking for the change, because an attacker will happily answer that line.
Keep the call short and specific. Ask the person who answers to confirm the new bank name, the last four digits of the new account, and the reason for the change. Ask who at their company authorised it. A genuine supplier will have these answers ready and will usually be pleased that you checked, since a diverted payment hurts them too. If the person is vague, or surprised, or unreachable, you have learned something valuable before any money has moved.
One small refinement helps a great deal. If the supplier has a named contact who deals with you, ask for that person by name rather than for accounts in general. An attacker who has only a mailbox rarely knows the voice that answers the phone in the real office.
Step three: a second person approves the first payment to any new or changed account
Even with the callback done, the first payment to a new or changed account deserves a second look. In a small firm this can be as simple as the owner or a trusted manager opening the payment list and reading the beneficiary name and account against the confirmation note. It takes two minutes and it catches honest typing errors as well as fraud.
If your bank offers it, use the feature that requires two approvers for payments above a limit you choose. Many small businesses leave it switched off because it feels like bureaucracy. In practice it is the cheapest control available, because it puts a second human being between a single compromised mailbox and the money. Set the limit low enough that it applies to your normal supplier payments, not only to the exceptional ones.
There is a further, quieter benefit. When two people are involved, neither can be blamed alone, and neither is under pressure to prove that nothing could have gone wrong. That is a healthier position for both, and it makes a good culture for the rest of your controls.
Step four: make a small test payment, and keep a record
The last step is optional for small amounts and valuable for large ones. Before the full sum goes to a new account, send a small payment and ask the supplier to confirm receipt through the same number you used for the callback. It costs a little time and a small bank charge. It confirms that the account exists, that it belongs to the person you think it does, and that the supplier is looking at it.
Whatever you decide on the test payment, write down what you did. A single line in a shared sheet is enough: the date, the supplier, who made the callback, which number was used, who approved, and the outcome. This record is useful in three ways. It reminds the team that the habit is real. It gives you something to show a bank or an insurer if a dispute ever arises. And it shows you, over a quarter, how often changes happen, which is itself a useful signal. A supplier who changes bank details twice in a year deserves a conversation.
Tightening the mailbox behind the habit
The callback habit protects you even if everything else fails, but it is worth reducing the chance that your own mailbox is the weak point. Switch on a second sign-in step for every account that can see invoices or approve payments. Make sure staff who leave lose access on the day they go. Look at the forwarding rules on the finance mailbox now and then, because a hidden rule that copies incoming mail to an outside address is a favourite trick. And tell your suppliers, politely, that you will always confirm any change of bank details by telephone. Most will welcome it, and some will adopt the same rule for their own customers.
If your accounting software lets you lock beneficiary details so that changes need a named approver, use that feature. It converts the written rule into a technical one, which is stronger on a bad day.
What to do if the money has already moved
Sometimes the doubt arrives after the payment, when the real supplier telephones to ask where their money is. Speed matters more than anything else at that point. Call your bank immediately, tell them that the payment was made to an account obtained through a fraudulent request, and ask them to attempt a recall and to alert the receiving bank. Preserve the original email with its full headers, the invoice, and your payment confirmation. Report the matter through the official cybercrime channel in your country, and inform your insurer if you hold a policy. Then tell the genuine supplier plainly what happened, so they can check their own mailbox.
None of this guarantees recovery, which is exactly why the prevention steps matter more than the response. But a business that acts within the first hours has a far better chance than one that waits to be sure.
A one-page version to pin up
If you take only one thing from this article, make it a single page that your accounts team can see. It should say that a changed bank account is never updated from an email alone; that the callback is made on a number from your own records; that a second person approves the first payment to any new or changed account; and that the outcome is noted in the log. Four lines, signed by the owner, are enough. The aim is not to make your people suspicious of every supplier. It is to give them a calm, standard reply when the next urgent message arrives, which is simply that the policy requires a quick call first.
One question to take away
When did your business last change a supplier's bank details, and who confirmed it, how, and on which number? If nobody can answer in a sentence, you have found your first improvement. Tell me in the comments how your team handles this today; I read every reply.
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Book a Cyber-Risk ReviewPublished 15 November 2026 · dibyenduchoudhury.com